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  • Court of Protection Costs: SCCO Introduces Document Upload Centre (DUC) Guidance – April 2026

    Key Takeaways • SCCO introduces Document Upload Centre for supporting papers • Bill of costs must still be issued via CE-File • DUC bundles must be PDF and chronological • One bundle preferred where possible The Senior Courts Costs Office (SCCO) has issued revised guidance concerning the filing of supporting papers in Court of Protection bills of costs. The new guidance introduces the Document Upload Centre (DUC) as a method for submitting supporting documentation electronically when lodging Court of Protection bills for assessment. The updated SCCO guidance was issued on 16 March 2026 and takes effect from 20 April 2026. For costs lawyers and law costs draftsmen preparing Court of Protection bills, the guidance clarifies how supporting papers should be filed, how bundles should be structured, and when documentation should be uploaded. This article explains the SCCO Document Upload Centre (DUC) process and the practical implications for practitioners preparing Court of Protection costs bills. SCCO Court of Protection Bills – Quick Guidance Summary The key points from the SCCO guidance are: • Supporting papers may now be uploaded electronically using the Document Upload Centre (DUC) • The bill of costs itself must still be filed via CE-File • Supporting papers should normally be uploaded in one bundle where possible • Documents must be in chronological order • Files must be in PDF format • Bundles should contain clear headings and indexing These requirements apply to supporting documentation for Court of Protection costs assessments conducted by the SCCO. What Is the SCCO Document Upload Centre (DUC)? The Document Upload Centre (DUC) is an electronic portal that allows practitioners to upload supporting papers relating to Court of Protection bills of costs. The system is intended to assist the Senior Courts Costs Office in reviewing documentation efficiently during costs assessment. It is important to note that the DUC is only used for supporting papers. The following documents must still be issued through CE-File in the usual way: • the bill of costs • the N258B request for detailed assessment • the court order authorising the bill to be assessed Once the bill has been issued, supporting documentation can then be uploaded to the SCCO Document Upload Centre. Access to the DUC is obtained by contacting the SCCO. When Should Supporting Papers Be Uploaded? The SCCO guidance distinguishes between existing cases and new Court of Protection matters. Existing SCCO cases Where the matter already has an SCCO reference number, supporting papers should be uploaded to the DUC at the same time the bill is lodged for issue via CE-File. New Court of Protection bills where the matter has not yet been allocated an SCCO reference number, supporting papers should be uploaded after the bill has been accepted and the reference number issued. For example: SC-2025-COP-001234. Confirming the Filing Method on CE-File when submitting a bill through CE-File, practitioners must confirm how supporting papers will be filed. This should be included within the “filing comments” section of the filing information page. Typical examples include: • “Supporting papers to follow via DUC” • “Supporting papers to be filed by post” If the intended method of filing is not confirmed, the filing may be rejected. Required Format for SCCO DUC Uploads Supporting papers uploaded to the Document Upload Centre must comply with specific format requirements. PDF format All files must be uploaded in PDF format. File naming conventions, file names should include: • the SCCO case reference • the protected party’s surname It is also helpful to identify the type of bill or period covered, for example: • General Management costs • statutory will application • property purchase or sale • gift application Bundle Structure for Supporting Papers The SCCO guidance indicates that one bundle is preferred where possible. Where multiple files are uploaded, each should be clearly labelled so that the contents can be easily identified by the Costs Officer. For example: SC-2025-COP-001234 – File 1 – Jan-March SC-2025-COP-001234 - File 2 – April-June Supporting papers should not be uploaded as multiple individual files containing single documents. Chronological Order of Documents All documents within the bundle should be organised in chronological order from the oldest to the newest. This assists the SCCO in locating the relevant documentation when reviewing the bill. Key Documents That Should Appear at the Start of the Bundle The SCCO guidance recommends that certain documents should appear at the beginning of the bundle or within a clearly labelled section. These include: • OPG102 and OPG105 forms • the client care letter • disbursement invoices including counsel’s fees where applicable File Notes, Emails and Attendance Notes should contain clear headings showing: • the date • the fee earner • the time claimed • the parties involved in the communication This assists the Costs Officer in cross-referencing documents with entries within the bill of costs. Indexing and Organisation of Supporting Papers to assist the SCCO in reviewing documentation efficiently, the bundle should ideally include: • an index or bookmarks • clear document descriptions • dates corresponding with the bill entries Where possible, duplicate documents or repeated email chains should be avoided. Physical Filing of Court of Protection Supporting Papers The SCCO guidance confirms that paper filing remains available. Where practitioners choose to file supporting papers physically, documents should be sent to the SCCO as soon as possible after receiving the CE-File acceptance notification, and in any event within 28 days. Where multiple bundles or boxes are filed, each should be clearly labelled to indicate: • the contents • the chronological order Practical Implications for Costs Draftsmen Although the revised SCCO guidance primarily concerns document filing, it reinforces the importance of clear and properly structured supporting papers. For costs draftsmen preparing Court of Protection bills, the guidance highlights several practical points: • supporting papers should correspond clearly with the bill entries • bundles should be clearly indexed and organised • documents should appear in chronological order • duplicate documentation should be avoided Well-organised supporting papers assist the SCCO in reviewing the bill and reduce the risk of delay during assessment. Court of Protection Costs Drafting Court of Protection costs are assessed by the Senior Courts Costs Office under a distinct procedural framework. Practitioners preparing these bills must ensure that both the bill of costs and supporting documentation comply with SCCO practice. Further guidance on the assessment process can be found here: General Management Costs | Court of Protection & SCCO Assessment Our work includes: • preparation of bills of costs • detailed assessment proceedings • Court of Protection costs drafting Learn more about our specialist services here: Costs lawyers and law costs draftsmen Summary The SCCO has issued updated guidance introducing the Document Upload Centre (DUC) for the electronic submission of supporting papers in Court of Protection costs bills. While the bill itself must still be filed through CE-File, the DUC provides a structured method for uploading documentation used in support of the bill. The guidance emphasises the importance of: • correctly formatted PDF bundles • clear file naming conventions • chronological document order • indexed supporting papers For costs lawyers and law costs draftsmen preparing Court of Protection bills, compliance with these requirements will assist the SCCO in reviewing documentation efficiently and reduce the risk of delay during assessment.

  • Requesting Provisional/Detailed Assessment of Costs – avoiding potential pitfalls

    Requesting Provisional/Detailed Assessment of Costs – avoiding potential pitfalls. It is imperative that matters are not delayed unduly as, whilst permission to Commence or Request an Assessment, either Provisional or Detailed of Costs, out of time is no longer required, there are penalties for delays. In addition to the 3 months allowed for commencement of the assessment process (CPR 47.7), CPR 47.14 (1) further provides that “Where points of dispute are served in accordance with this Part, the receiving party must file a request for a detailed assessment hearing within 3 months of the expiry of the period for commencing detailed assessment proceedings.” hence there is, potentially, a maximum time of 6 months from the date of the Order or other authority for assessment in which to Request a Provisional or Detailed Assessment. Within that time period, and provided neither of the 3 month periods are exceeded, a paying party cannot seek any sanction against a paying party. If, however, such periods are exceeded it is open to the paying party to make and Application to the Court to compel commencement (CPR 47.8(1) &(2)) or to Request a Detailed Assessment (CPR 47.14(2) & (3)) within a given period and in default disallow all or part of the costs. Even in the event that such an Application is not made, it is still open to the paying party upon any Assessment to request the disallowance of interest for the period of any delay; CPR 47.8(3) & 47.14(4). It is therefore important to bear in mind these time limits, especially for Requesting Provisional or Detailed Assessment, as otherwise the consequences in both lost costs and interest can, potentially, be substantial. So, once a Bill of Costs has been served under a Notice of Commencement [N252], Points of Dispute and Replies have been served, and yet agreement still has not been reached between the parties, what next? Where the total costs claimed are £75k or less the costs will normally be dealt with by provisional assessment; CPR 47.15(1). “This rule applies to any detailed assessment proceedings commenced in the High Court or the County Court on or after 1 April 2013 in which the costs claimed are the amount set out in paragraph 14.1 of the practice direction supplementing this Part, or less” “The amount of costs referred to in rule 47.15(1) is £75,000.”; CPD 14.1 It is open for the parties to request that, because they consider the matter to be unsuitable for Provisional Assessment due to complexity etc, that it be assessed with the parties present in a more traditional Assessment Hearing and, further, also open to the Court to order that, while the matter is under £75,000.00, it is not suitable for Provisional Assessment; CPR 47.15(6). Such a decision is, however, entirely at the discretion of the Court. Further, parties should be aware that if the matter does not proceed by Provisional Assessment, but by a hearing with advocates present, the costs cap for Provisional Assessment of Costs and the potential protection which that may provide to a party (CPR 47.15(5)) will no longer apply. A request for Provisional/Detailed Assessment of Costs is made by filing the relevant form [N258] and associated documents at Court; this form may be downloaded and completed from the Courts website (1). Whilst details of the documents that need to be enclosed with the form are listed in the Practice Direction (section 13.2 supplementing CPR 47), fortunately and more for the assistance of all concerned, the N258 contains a check list of what needs to be sent to the Court with the request. Going through the “tick boxes” these are as follows: – 1. The document giving the right to detailed assessment; 2. The Notice of Commencement; 3. The Bill of Costs; 4. The Points of Dispute and Replies in the form of Precedent G(2); 5. A statement giving the names, address for service and references of all parties to whom the Court should give notice of hearing; 6. The relevant details of any additional liability claimed; 7. Copies of all the orders made by the Court relating to the costs of proceedings which are to be assessed; 8. Any fee notes of counsel or other disbursements relating to items in dispute; and 9. Where there is a dispute as to the receiving parties liability to pay, the client care letter delivered to the receiving party or the legal representatives retainer. Practitioners should pay particular attention to item 9 and check that those documents enclosed are compliant with the Rules as the effect on recoverability of additional liabilities may potentially be severe and further a failure to enclose such documents, in turn failing to appraise the Court of the retainer, may result in a Bill of Costs being assessed at nil for want of evidence of a valid retainer. If the request is for an Assessment of costs claimed in excess of £75,000.00, such an assessment will not be dealt with provisionally and thus the appropriate box confirming the cost claimed are over £75,000.00 should be ticked and an estimate of the anticipated time required for the hearing given. However where the costs are £75,000.00 or less then the other box should be ticked and an additional copy of the bill, together with a Statement of the Costs claimed in respect of the assessment provided, based on the assumption that there will not be an oral hearing, enclosed with the N258. When preparing the Statement of Costs in respect of a Provisional Assessment, whilst such costs are limited, in respect of between the parties recovery, under the cap prescribed by CPR 47.15(5) to £1,500.00 plus Vat and court fees, there is no requirement to so limit the schedule and, indeed, it is the writer’s view that showing the full extent of the costs actually incurred in the assessment process can only serve to enhance recoveries for the successful party to as close to, if not actually at the limit prescribed. In practice, applications for provisional or detailed assessment often expose wider strategic issues around budgeting, proportionality, and recoverability that can materially affect the outcome. Solicitors frequently instruct specialist Costs Lawyers or Law Costs Draftsmen at this stage to ensure assessment strategy aligns with the applicable procedural framework and judicial approach. Further detail on how specialist costs professionals support assessment proceedings is explained on our Costs Lawyers and Law Costs Draftsmen in England & Wales Where Part 8 (costs only) proceedings have been issued the a separate Statement of Costs should be prepared for those costs as the limitation under CPR 47.15(5) relates to the “…costs of the assessment…” only and thus should not include any other elements(3). (1) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65969741614fa2000df3a8c3/N258_0514.pdf ( 2 ) https://www.justice.gov.uk/documents/annex-precedent-q.pdf (3) whilst there is, as yet, no formal authority in this regard, the matter of Tasleem v Beverley [2013] EWCA Civ 1805 provides a useful guide as to what constitutes costs of assessment and what does not. Issues arising during provisional assessment often overlap with questions of recoverability, fee earner justification, and the way work has been structured within the bill. Where disputes concern resistance to claimed costs, proportionality arguments, or strategic reduction points raised by the opponent, these matters fall squarely within the landscape of paying party costs disputes , where procedural knowledge and assessment strategy directly influence outcomes. Detailed Assessment Strategy Guides Detailed Assessment of Costs: The Complete Guide Paying Party Detailed Assessment Strategy How Paying Parties Challenge a Bill of Costs Proportionality Challenges at Detailed Assessment Fee Earner Delegation Challenges at Detailed Assessment Guideline Hourly Rates 2026 Intermediate Track Costs Tables

  • Interest on Costs - a new approach

    The debate over interest is one which has been ongoing since the inception of the aged legislation which still governs entitlement to it, section 17 of the Judgements Act 1838 as enacted, which stated “XVII​ Judgment Debts to carry Interest. And be it enacted, That every Judgment Debt shall carry Interest at the Rate of Four Pounds per Centum per Annum from the Time of entering up the Judgment, or from the Time of the Commencement of this Act in Cases of Judgments then entered up and not carrying Interest, until the same shall be satisfied, and such Interest may be levied under a Writ of Execution on such Judgment. “ and thus the positions were largely left open for the Courts to determine when interest should run from and to, with a discretion to disallow the same for any given periods, as they saw fit. Further guidance and interpretation with regard to when that entitlement should arise were then handed down over the course of some 145 years, with the courts ultimately adopting two approaches to interest as to when the same should run from, these being the ‘incipitur’ and ‘allocatur’ rules, the former providing for any entitlement to interest to run from the date upon which the Order for Costs is made, and the latter from the date upon which any liability for costs is quantified. The established rule which has largely prevailed across the years has been the incipitur rule, however debate has been ongoing as the Courts have expressed concerns and dissatisfaction with both, most notably in Erven Warnink BV v J Townsend & Sons (Hull) (No 2) [1983] 3 All ER 312 and more recently in Thomas v Bunn [1991] 1 AC 362 and Hunt -v- R M Douglas (Roofing) Ltd [1998] 3 All ER 823. After Hunt there was further change when the Civil Procedure Rules were introduced on 26 April 1999. Upon their introduction, section 17 of the Judgements Act 1838 was amended such that (1) Every judgment debt shall carry interest at the rate of… [currently 8]… pounds per centum per annum from such time as shall be prescribed by rules of court until the same shall be satisfied, and such interest may be levied under a writ of execution on such judgment. (2) Rules of court may provide for the court to disallow all or part of any interest otherwise payable under subsection (1). with the main change being that interest was now to run “…from such time as shall be prescribed by rules of court…”. The rules, in turn, at CPR 40.8(1) provided that (1) Where interest is payable on a judgment pursuant to section 17 of the Judgments Act 1838 or section 74 of the County Courts Act 1984, the interest shall begin to run from the date that judgment is given unless – (a) a rule in another Part or a practice direction makes different provision; or (b) the court orders otherwise. and so the previously established principle that the Court retained the discretion to award interest from a date later than any costs order was preserved. So, it is fair to say that, whilst there has been an established principle that the incipitur rule prevails for a great many years, the position has never been set in stone and the Courts have retained a discretion to vary this position. And so it is that, in the matter of Involnert Management Inc v Aprilgrange Limited & Others [2015] EWHC 2834 (Comm) the Commercial Court was asked once more to consider the position as to when interest should apply from. The judgement of the Court focused on the single issue of interest, and noted continued dissatisfaction as to the established principles more traditionally applied, with Mr Justice Leggatt considering it to be “…desirable…” for a date from which interest should run to be “…some objective benchmark…”. In adopting a benchmark, Mr Justice Leggatt considered (at [18] to [24]) that there were 6 conclusions which could be reached, which were 1. that pursuant to Hunt the Judgments Act provided a default date from which interest would be payable, unless the Court orders interest to run from some other date; 2. that there was nothing within either “…the Judgments Act or the Civil Procedure Rules which expressly or impliedly restricts the power of the court under CPR 40.8(1) to order the interest payable under section 17 of the Judgments Act to run from a different date, or which requires exceptional circumstances to be shown before that power is exercised.” and in fact the contrary was true given the very broad discretion afforded to the Court to “…order otherwise…” being exercised to deal with cases justly, in accordance with the overriding objective; 3. “…that the date from which Judgments Act interest runs should not be deferred simply because it is at a considerably higher rate than commercial rates. The rate at which interest should be payable under the Judgments Act is a matter for the Secretary of State to decide. The court’s concern is to identify the date from which it is appropriate that interest should run on the judgment debt at whatever rate is fixed by statutory instrument as the appropriate rate of interest for judgment debts to carry. Whether that statutory rate is (at the moment) higher or lower than commercial rates of interest cannot be a relevant consideration.” 4. that the decision of the House of Lords in Hunt did not prevent interest from running from the date upon which that payable amount is assessed, the allocator rule, although he did observe that such an approach had not been adopted in any of the cases considered; 5. “…in terms of what justice requires, I do not think it just to make an order under which interest begins to run at the rate appropriate for unpaid judgment debts before the paying party could reasonably be expected to pay the debt; and, in a case where the court has ordered a suitable interim payment to be made on account of costs, I do not think it reasonable to expect the party liable for costs to pay the balance of the debt until it knows exactly what sums are being claimed by the party awarded costs and has had a fair opportunity to decide what sums it accepts are properly payable…” as to do otherwise would have led to unfairness, especially in “…cases where a particularly large amount of costs is likely to be outstanding for a particularly long period…”; and 6. “…I think it desirable to set a date from which Judgments Act interest will run which is based, if possible, on some objective benchmark and does not depend simply on the judge’s general feeling of what length of postponement is fair…It will do no favours to litigants – particularly as the amount of money at stake, while not negligible, is never likely to be large – if the date from which Judgments Act interest will be ordered to run is unpredictable, thus encouraging argument on the issue in every case…” Thus Mr Justice Leggatt concluded that “…a reasonable objective benchmark to take is the period prescribed by the rules of court for commencing detailed assessment proceedings…” namely 3 months from the date of the entitlement to costs under CPR 47.7. This judgment presents an interesting new position as to the application of interest. At first blush, it appears to suggest that interest on costs should only run from the expiry of the period for commencing Detailed Assessment, thus in every case it will only be able to be recovered from 3 months after the entitlement arises. Indeed it is expected that many paying parties may adopt such an approach as their position. However, when read in the context of the judgement as a whole, it is clear that such a position is intended only to be a desirable default as there is clear reference within the judgement to the injustice of a paying party being liable for interest during a period when they may not know the amount of the substantive costs which they are expected to indemnify, especially where there may be a delay in serving the Bill. Thus, for receiving parties, it will be imperative, if they are to recover interest from the earliest possible point, to ensure that there are no unreasonable delays in presenting any Bill of Costs to the paying party. In practice, disputes about interest frequently arise within paying party costs disputes , where assessment strategy can significantly affect both the principle sum and any interest allowed. Issues concerning interest on costs frequently arise alongside wider disputes about assessment, timing, and recoverability. In many cases, specialist costs advice is required to ensure interest arguments are advanced consistently with the underlying costs strategy. Our role as Costs Lawyers and Law Costs Draftsmen, including advising on interest and assessment issues, is explained further on our Costs Lawyers and Law Costs Draftsmen in England & Wales . These issues frequently arise within wider paying party costs disputes, where careful analysis of the bill and strategic challenges can significantly reduce overall liability For our full paying party detailed assessment service see: 👉 Detailed Assessment Paying Party Services 👉 Paying Party Costs Lawyers Detailed Assessment Strategy Guides Detailed Assessment of Costs: The Complete Guide Paying Party Detailed Assessment Strategy How Paying Parties Challenge a Bill of Costs Proportionality Challenges at Detailed Assessment Fee Earner Delegation Challenges at Detailed Assessment Guideline Hourly Rates 2026 Intermediate Track Costs Tables

  • Costs Disallowed for Misconduct: GSD Law Ltd v Wardman [2017] EWCA Civ 2144

    **Editorial note:** This case note discusses costs disallowance for misconduct. For a broader view of litigation costs recoverability, detailed assessment consequences, and costs risk, see our guide to specialist costs lawyers and law costs draftsmen . There have, in the past, been occasions where allegations have been made that a receiving party has incorrectly or even inappropriately included work in between the parties costs claims, such allegations being most normally vented within correspondence or in Points of Dispute. Often such are innocent oversights and are conceded in fairly short order once brought to the attention of the receiving party, but very occasionally the Court’s intervention (and subsequent adjudication) is required to resolve the issue. Very rarely is such a matter the subject of a reported or published decision, nor often are such decisions handed down at much more than first instance. A prime example of this rare animal was the widely circulated decision of District Judge Deurden, sitting as a Regional Costs Judge in the County Court at Bury, in the matter of Ramsay v InStore Plc (Bury County Court 29 April 2008), in which the claimant’s solicitors had served five grossly inflated costs schedules marked “without prejudice”, only to significantly reduce their costs claims when formal bills were served. The Regional Costs Judge ordered, at a preliminary hearing, that the ‘without prejudice’ protection normally afforded to schedules be removed so that they could be used as evidence. As a result, the claimant’s solicitors withdrew all five bills and agreed to pay the defendant’s costs in full. More recently, in the matter of Penny v ABV Systems, the claimant’s solicitors served a costs schedule of over £52,000, the same being considered excessive in the opinion of the paying party in comparison to the substantive matter, and an offer of just £16,886.00 was made. This was not agreeable to the receiving party, who issued Part 8 proceedings and thereafter served a formal Bill of Costs. Within the assessment process, the claimant’s solicitors failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the difference between the schedule which had been served, containing elements of duplication between the Grade B conducting fee earner and the Grade A supervising partner, as a result of which the paying party sought Counsel’s advice as to whether to take the matter to an assessment hearing. The schedule of costs (as in the matter of Ramsay) did not contain a statement of truth and Counsel’s opinion considered the paying party’s offer would likely be bettered at any assessment, therefore the decision was taken that the matter should proceed with the offer being maintained. The matter did not, however, reach a hearing, as the receiving party accepted the paying party’s offer and paid their costs. More recently still, the legal press have widely reported the demise of Asons who agreed to pay AXA Insurance £113,000.00 (comprising £70,000 plus interest and approximately £40,000 in legal costs) to settle disputed costs after admitting that it ‘falsely and systematically’ exaggerated its claim for costs in 65 personal injury cases. These examples, it should be stressed and as noted at the outset, are by far the exception rather than the rule, and are extremely rare, with the overwhelming majority of firms submitting entirely forthright and justifiable claims for costs. It is therefore almost entirely unknown for such matters to come before the Court of Appeal, and to do so truly represents an extraordinary scenario. The matter of GSD Law Ltd v Wardman & Others [2017] EWCA 2144 originated in the County Court at Leeds, before District Judge Neaves, and involved 14 personal injury claims in respect of which GSD were on the record for the claimants in 9 and acted as agents for Sovereign Solicitors in respect of the remaining 5, with the work being undertaken in all matters under CFAs. Upon successful completion of the substantive claims, informal schedules of costs were served on behalf of all 14 receiving parties, and these proving incapable of agreement, formal Bills of Costs were prepared and served under Notices of Commencement. The paying party then served Points of Dispute to all 14 matters, however such contained the rather unusual title “Particulars of Allegations” and specifically alleged fraud and misconduct against the claimants and put them on notice that the paying parties intended to argue that it had: “…caused the receiving parties [i.e. the claimants in the substantive proceedings] to be guilty of (gross) misconduct within the meaning of CPR rule 44.14 [now, CPR 44.11] and … as such they should both be denied their costs and they should pay the costs of the assessment” further alleging “…a systematic attempt by GSD to claim more in without prejudice schedules than is properly claimable…“, which if successful would lead the claimants to be personally enriched; that they had “…claimed hourly rates which were higher than those that were properly and honestly claimable…“; “…attempted to mislead the paying parties as to the status of the persons who carried out the work…“; “…claimed profit costs for work that was not done…“; “…claimed additional liabilities which were either not payable at all or which were less than the amounts claimed…“; and to have “…claimed a ‘drafting fee’ that did not exist…“ all of which gave rise to some very serious allegations requiring to be answered by the claimants. On 16 November 2012, District Judge Bedford, Regional Costs Judge gave directions for all 14 of the detailed assessments to be case-managed together, and for the parties to choose two sample cases that were “…indicative of the issues raised in the other cases…” and for the remaining matters to be stayed. It was also ordered that there be a hearing for certain preliminary issues such as “…the relevant jurisdictions that are open to the Court on the facts of this case, and in particular, whether the Court is able to reduce or limit the sums claimed on the grounds of misconduct or fraud, and if so, under which powers the Court may do so…”. The claimants served a “Reply to Allegations” on 21 December 2012, responding to the specific allegations as well as containing more general denials and, by that stage, two cases had also been selected. On 7 & 8 May 2014, the preliminary issues came before District Judge Neaves, Regional Costs Judge, with Sovereign Solicitors applying for, and being granted, permission to discontinue the detailed assessment proceedings in respect of the five cases in which they had acted. Oral evidence was heard across the two days, however the total required testimony of the witnesses could not be completed by the close of the second day. As a result of this, and the need to reconvene at a later date District Judge Neaves suggested “I am just throwing this open as a suggestion but it would deal with the matter if in between now and that adjourned hearing, Mr Friston, if you were to effectively draft something akin to an indictment? That is perhaps not entirely the appropriate word but I do think we need that level of specificity because I am clearly going to be invited to make specific findings on all of these cases and I need to be very clear as to what those findings are. The witness needs to be equally clear as to what exactly is being put to her in each of those cases.” and on 19 June 2014, the paying parties served their further document headed “‘Indictment-Style’ List of Allegations of Fraud and Misconduct” seeking to add one new allegation as follows “On 17 January 2014 GSD, instructed their agents, Blacks LLP, to make a complaint to the Costs Lawyer Standards Board about the Defendants’ costs lawyer (Mr Williams); that complaint was made in the context of the whole of this litigation, including the test cases. That complaint was a blatant attempt to discredit Mr Williams for the purposes of getting the upper hand in this litigation. GSD’s principal has confirmed under cross-examination that the allegations contained within it were false and that she knew that they were false. This was (gross and serious) misconduct within the meaning of CPR rule 44.11(1)(b).” GSD served a “Reply to Allegations” on 18 July 2014 which, inter alia, stated “The ‘hourly rate’ point is answered by reference to the retainers. These are attached hereto.” enclosing an attachment which, on the face of it, appeared to be a signed conditional fee agreement (“CFA”) which referred to an hourly charging rate of £203. This aspect of the charging rate was one specifically addressed in some detail by way of example, within the “Indictment-Style” list of allegations, noting “In the Schedule, GSD claimed an hourly rate of £203 per hour, this being a false representation of what was reasonably claimable. This was for one or both of the following reasons: (i) it was a rate that exceeded the rate set out in Mr Ismail’s fee agreement, and (ii) it was a rate that was grossly excessive given the fact that much of the work was carried out by a junior fee earner.” and the rate of £203 per hour was consistent with the sample “Ismail” CFA attached to the “Reply to Allegations” (which District Judge Neaves termed “CFA 1”) so, on the face of it, it appeared that there was a reasonable response to an otherwise serious allegation. The hearing resumed on 8 September 2014, oral evidence was completed with, during the course of the same, Ms Madhas being asked to produce the original of CFA 1, however she produced 2 sheets of paper which unlike CFA ,1, contained no handwritten date and gave an hourly rate of £180, causing the District Judge to conclude that this could not be the original of CFA 1. Equally, a third document found in a trial bundle that also purported to be the CFA for Mr Ismail and which the District Judge called “CFA 3”, recorded that it also referred to an hourly rate of £180 and, the District Judge observed “…[t]he ‘6’ of the handwritten date on CFA 3 does not appear to match the ‘6’ that can be made out on CFA 1…”. Following completion of the oral evidence, directions were given for both parties to give closing submissions in writing in which, the claimant accepted that there had been “…unreasonable conduct in the two sample files…” but that “…GSD/Ms Madhas’ is a case of ‘carelessness’ as to her administrative duties through inadvertence…” and therefore the Court should allow the costs in the sample files subject to assessment, following which District Judge Neaves handed down his written judgment at a hearing on 15 December 2014. Within that judgement, he found that Ms Madhas (on the topic of CFA 1) “…accepted that CFA 1 was a forgery. She was unable to explain how that forged document came to be appended to the reply, although earlier during the hearing she had suggested that her administrative team had copied and sent over documents. To the extent that that is tendered as an explanation, I do not accept it. It is inconceivable that a solicitor, facing such serious allegations, would delegate to others the task of ensuring that the correct documents were before the courts.” was “…a wholly unreliable witness…” with her evidence “…not only evasive and inconsistent, but dishonest…”, further finding that all the allegations made against GSD to have been proved, and that the extent of the conduct and dishonesty of GSD was at the most serious end of the scale, concluding “The conduct of the receiving party’s solicitor is sufficiently egregious as to make the only appropriate sanction the disallowance of all costs on the sample files. The receiving party will also pay the costs of the assessment proceedings including the preliminary issues.” The claimants applied for permission to appeal to the District Judge who, in granting permission, noted that there was a “…dearth of authority to guide the court in the manner as to which CPR 44.11 procedures should be conducted when serious allegations of dishonesty are made against a receiving party…”. Upon the appeal, 5 grounds of appeal were put forward, inter alia, that the District Judge had “…purported to use the CPR 44.11 powers in a manner which was entirely inconsistent with their purpose to be an ancillary jurisdiction intended to be summary in nature and which does not require the consideration of detailed allegations of alleged dishonest conduct…” and, further, that the procedure that the District Judge had adopted was unfair. The appeal was dismissed by HHJ Gosnell in a written judgment on 8 July 2015, finding that, in respect of the allegation that the procedure had been unfair, that they had not and that the claimants “…had more than adequate notice of the allegations against them and were given a full opportunity to respond to them…“, that in respect of the certifications to the bills that it was apparent that it “…appeared on both the costs schedule and Bill of costs of [GSD] and the indemnity principle had in both documents been breached as found by the Judge below and conceded by counsel on behalf of [GSD]…” and that “In my view it was incumbent on the Judge to investigate factually whether these numerous alleged breaches of the indemnity principle and the consequent signing of misleading certificates were part of a habitual or systemic scheme to obtain unreasonable amounts of costs or were mere coincidences caused by genuine errors. The signing of a certificate on the bill of costs certifying its accuracy is very important. If paying parties lost confidence in the bona fides of solicitors signing these certificates the consequences for civil litigation as a whole would be significant. Paying parties would be reluctant to negotiate informal settlement of costs and would insist on a Bill being served and they would then insist on seeing the document which evidences the retainer to ensure the indemnity principle had not been breached. This was the very evil which Bailey v IBC Vehicles was intended to address. The allegations made in this case were serious and went to the heart of the detailed assessment process. Many of the documents which had to be examined would have been examined as part of the detailed assessment process anyway (in particular the documents evidencing the retainer). In my view it would have been an abdication of the court’s duty not to investigate these allegations.” and further concluding in respect of the CPR 44.11 point “The alleged misconduct in this case goes to the very heart of the detailed assessment process and examination of some of the issues would be called for on a detailed assessment in any event. The Court has an important role in maintaining professional standards and ensuring that parties behave fairly and honestly towards each other in the litigation process. In my judgment the Judge below was right to investigate this conduct under the summary procedure envisaged by CPR 44.11 and certainly cannot be said to be out with the wide discretion open to him when deciding how to deal with this issue.” referring to Bailey v IBC Vehicles Ltd [1998] 3 All ER 570, in which Henry LJ, at 575-576, observed “RSC Ord 62, r 29(7)(c)(iii) requires the solicitor who brings proceedings for taxation to sign the bill of costs. In so signing he certifies that the contents of the bill are correct. That signature is no empty formality. The bill specifies the hourly rates applied, and the care and attention uplift claimed. If an agreement between the receiving solicitor and his client (here the trade union) restricted (say) the hourly rate payable by the client, that hourly rate is the most that can be claimed or recovered on taxation (see General of Berne Insurance Co v Jardine Reinsurance Management Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 301). The signature of the bill of costs under the rules is effectively the certificate by an officer of the court that the receiving party’s solicitors are not seeking to recover in relation to any item more than they have agreed to charge their client under a contentious business agreement. The court can (and should unless there is evidence to the contrary) assume that his signature to the bill of costs shows that the indemnity principle has not been offended…. … And the other side of a presumption of trust afforded to the signature of an officer of the court must be that breach of that trust should be treated as a most serious disciplinary offence.” Dissatisfied with the judgment of HHJ Gosnall, the claimants appealed to the Court of Appeal, raising two issues (as per [25]) Should District Judge Neaves have declined to entertain the allegations against GSD because CPR 44.11 is a summary jurisdiction, akin to that regarding wasted costs? [“The Summary Jurisdiction Issue”] Was the procedure that was adopted unfair? [“The Unfair Procedure Issue”] which issues were dealt with in order by the court in its judgment, published on 15 December 2017. Giving judgment Newey LJ noted, in respect of “The Summary Jurisdiction Issue”, that (at [39]) “…it was right to entertain the application under CPR 44.11. The paying parties were contending that costs “which [were] being assessed” should be disallowed because of “unreasonable or improper” conduct in connection with the assessment of costs; the allegations could be addressed in the context of pending assessment proceedings; certain of the allegations (in particular, those relating to the bills of costs) would fall to be addressed anyway in those proceedings; there is no suggestion that legal professional privilege presented any difficulty; and the complaints made by the paying parties did not call for any inquiry into the merits of the substantive claims. It is also relevant that, as can be seen from what was said in Bailey v IBC Vehicles Ltd (for which, see paragraph 24 above), there is a strong public interest in ensuring that solicitors do not certify costs figures dishonestly: as Judge Gosnell noted, there would be unfortunate consequences if paying parties “lost confidence in the bona fides of solicitors signing these certificates”. Having regard both to seriousness of the allegations and to the sums potentially at stake, I do not think it was disproportionate to have a three-day hearing. I cannot see, moreover, how ordinary civil proceedings for fraudulent misrepresentation could have provided a satisfactory alternative to an application pursuant to CPR 44.11. In the first place, such a claim could itself fairly have been described as “satellite litigation”. Secondly, the power to disallow costs which it has been thought appropriate to confer on the Court by CPR 44.11 would not have been available, with the result, presumably, that loss could have been established only if and to the extent that the paying parties could have shown that costs were assessed at too high a figure as a result of deceit on the part of GSD; it would not appear to have been open to them to contend that costs should have been disallowed in their entirety. Thirdly, it is by no means clear to me that it would have been proper for the paying parties to seek to impugn the figures held to be due in the assessment proceedings: that might be thought to have involved an illegitimate attack on a previous Court determination (compare e.g. Phipson on Evidence, 18th ed., at paragraph 43-23, and Tibbs v Islington BC [2002] EWCA Civ 1682, at paragraphs 8, 15, 17-19, 21 and 22). ” and accordingly that aspect of the appeal was dismissed. Furthermore, in respect of “The Unfair Procedure Issue”, Newey LJ opined (at [44]) that “For my part, however, I agree with Judge Gosnell that the procedure was fair. Among other things: District Judge Bedford’s order of 16 November 2012 allowed GSD to join itself as a party whenever it wished. In the event, it elected to do so in September 2013, but it was evidently in the driving seat on the costs issues well before this. As mentioned in paragraph 8 above, the commercial interest always rested with GSD; The “Particulars of Allegations” served in November 2012 gave GSD and Ms Madhas sufficient notice of the case they had to meet at the hearing on 7 and 8 May 2014 and, in particular, the allegations of dishonesty. I am not entirely sure why District Judge Neaves proposed the “Indictment-Style” list of allegations (possibly, as Mr Smith suggested, to effect a “clearing of the decks”), but it in fact added little of substance to the “Particulars of Allegations”; and The “bombshell” arose from GSD choosing to attach to its “Reply to Allegations” of 18 July 2014 a document that proved to be a forgery. The paying parties cannot be criticised for their failure to refer to this in their “Particulars of Allegations” or “Indictment-Style” list of allegations since these pre-dated the “Reply to Allegations” and the forged document had not yet featured in the case. It is also significant that GSD did not suggest at the hearing on 8 September 2014 that it needed an adjournment to deal with the document.” and thus the appeal as a whole was unanimously dismissed, with Hamblen and Longmore LLJ concurring. The judgment handed down is striking by its findings. However, such issues are, in the writer’s experience, absolutely the exception within a profession which is dedicated to the very highest standards of integrity. It also, once again and in stark relief, demonstrates the necessity for straightforward and transparent billing practices. Allegations of misconduct frequently arise in detailed assessment disputes between paying and receiving parties. Detailed Assessment Strategy Guides Detailed Assessment of Costs: The Complete Guide Paying Party Detailed Assessment Strategy How Paying Parties Challenge a Bill of Costs Proportionality Challenges at Detailed Assessment Fee Earner Delegation Challenges at Detailed Assessment Guideline Hourly Rates 2026 Intermediate Track Costs Tables

  • Common Costs Budgeting Mistakes - and How SPH Costing Services Can Help Solicitors Avoid Them

    Costs budgeting remains one of the most important, and often misunderstood, aspects of modern litigation. Even experienced solicitors can encounter difficulties where budgets are prepared without specialist costs input or are not kept under review as proceedings develop. At SPH Costing Services, we regularly assist solicitors where avoidable budgeting issues have limited recovery or caused unnecessary disputes. Below, we set out the most common costs budgeting mistakes — and explain how we can help prevent them. Under-Estimating Future Phases A frequent issue we see is under-estimation of later phases such as disclosure, witness evidence and trial preparation. Where figures are too low, firms can find themselves undertaking substantial work that is not, or only partially, recoverable. How we help: We work closely with solicitors at the outset of proceedings to prepare realistic, defensible budgets. By drawing on experience of how costs are scrutinised at both budgeting hearings and detailed assessment, we help ensure that future phases properly reflect the likely work involved. Weak or Generic Budget Assumptions Budget assumptions are often overlooked, yet they are critical in explaining why costs are reasonable and proportionate. Generic or poorly drafted assumptions are more vulnerable to challenge and may limit recovery later on. How we help: SPH Costing Services prepares clear, case-specific assumptions that link directly to the pleaded issues and litigation strategy. This strengthens the budget at approval stage and provides essential context if costs are later assessed. Treating Costs Budgeting as a Box-Ticking Exercise Costs budgeting should support the way a case is run, not restrict it. We often see budgets prepared under time pressure or without proper costs input, which can cause difficulties as the case progresses. How we help: By becoming involved early, we ensure that the costs budget aligns with the solicitor’s strategy for conducting the litigation. Our role is to support the efficient prosecution or defence of the claim, while protecting recoverable costs. Failure to Monitor and Update the Budget Even the most carefully prepared budget can become outdated if circumstances change. Amendments to pleadings, unforeseen interlocutory applications or changes in scope can all justify a revision. How we help: We provide ongoing advice throughout the life of the case, including reviewing spend against budget and advising on whether a variation application is appropriate. This helps solicitors address issues proactively, rather than at the point of assessment. Recoverability of Costs Budgeting Costs on Detailed Assessment Where a costs management order has been made, the treatment of costs budgeting costs on detailed assessment requires careful alignment between the approved Precedent H and the bill of costs. The assumptions within the approved budget are the starting point. Costs included within the CMC or PTR phases of the Precedent H should appear in the corresponding phases of the bill. This avoids disputes as to whether those costs are: subject to the phase budget subject to the 1% or 2% caps on budgeting costs or both Separating budgeting costs into phase and non-phase sections without reference to the approved assumptions frequently leads to unnecessary argument and potential disallowance. For paying parties , this creates opportunities to: challenge budgeting costs that exceed the approved phase totals without good reason enforce the 1% and 2% caps where costs are claimed outside the budgeted phases scrutinise whether time claimed as case management work is in fact budgeting work Clear phase alignment between Precedent H and the bill remains the most effective way to minimise disputes and ensure proper application of the caps. Leaving Costs Advice Too Late Costs specialists are often instructed only when recovery is challenged, or when a budget has already become unrealistic. At that stage, options can be limited. How we help: Early instruction allows us to identify potential issues before they impact recovery. Whether at pre-action stage, costs budgeting or later review, timely costs input can make a significant difference to the outcome. Why Instruct SPH Costing Services? SPH Costing Services provides practical, commercially focused costs advice at all stages of litigation. Our involvement can: Improve the accuracy and credibility of costs budgets Support stronger budget approval outcomes Reduce the risk of unrecoverable work Assist with ongoing budget management and variation Maximise recovery at detailed assessment We work as an extension of the solicitor’s team, offering clear and pragmatic advice tailored to each case. Conclusion Costs budgeting is not simply a procedural requirement — it is a key part of effective litigation management. Involving a costs draftsman early and throughout proceedings can help solicitors avoid common pitfalls and protect recoverable costs. If you would like to discuss how SPH Costing Services can assist with costs budgeting or ongoing costs management, we are happy to provide initial guidance. Frequently Asked Questions About Instructing SPH Costing Services When should we instruct SPH Costing Services in relation to costs budgeting? Ideally, we should be instructed at the earliest opportunity, including at pre-action stage or when preparing the initial costs budget. Early involvement allows potential issues to be identified and addressed before they affect recovery. Can SPH assist if a costs budget has already been approved? Yes. We regularly advise on ongoing budget management, monitoring spend against budget and advising on whether a variation may be appropriate following changes in scope or circumstances. Do you only assist with preparing costs budgets? No. In addition to costs budgeting, we assist with drafting Bills of Costs, costs negotiations, detailed assessments, Legal Aid costs and Court of Protection matters. We can support solicitors at any stage of the costs process. We also support our local and police Authority Clients. How do you work with solicitors during the case? We work as an extension of the solicitor’s team, providing practical and responsive advice tailored to the needs of the case. Our aim is to support effective case management while protecting recoverable costs. Is a costs draftsperson cost-effective for budgeting work? Yes. Early costs input often results in higher recovery and fewer disputes later on. Our involvement at the budgeting stage can help avoid unrecoverable work and costly problems at assessment Detailed Assessment Strategy Guides Detailed Assessment of Costs: The Complete Guide Paying Party Detailed Assessment Strategy How Paying Parties Challenge a Bill of Costs Proportionality Challenges at Detailed Assessment Fee Earner Delegation Challenges at Detailed Assessment Guideline Hourly Rates 2026 Intermediate Track Costs Tables

  • FRC, Part 36 and Police Claims: Paying Party Lessons from Collins v Thames Valley Police [2026]

    The Senior Courts Costs Office decision in Collins v Thames Valley Police  [2026] provides important clarification for defendants dealing with fixed recoverable costs after settlement. The case addresses the interaction between Part 36, post-October 2023 FRC expansion, and police intentional tort claims, all of which frequently arise in modern paying party costs disputes. It is particularly relevant for those defending bills at detailed assessment. The Central Issue The substantive claim settled before proceedings were issued. However, costs-only proceedings were later brought under Part 8 after the expansion of fixed recoverable costs in October 2023. The key question was whether the costs should be: assessed on the standard basis, or restricted to fixed recoverable costs . The court also had to determine whether Part 36 wording displaced FRC and whether the inclusion of an intentional tort against the police removed the case from the fixed costs regime. Part 8 Costs-Only Proceedings and FRC The Senior Courts Costs Office confirmed that issuing Part 8 costs-only proceedings after October 2023 constitutes the “issue of proceedings” for the purpose of the transitional provisions. That means the procedural step, not the settlement date, determines whether FRC applies. For defendants, this reinforces the importance of analysing: when costs-only proceedings were issued whether the case falls within the extended FRC regime whether an exemption genuinely applies These arguments should be raised early in points of dispute Part 36 Does Not Automatically Disapply FRC The court confirmed that acceptance of a Part 36 offer providing for costs “in accordance with CPR 36.13 does not contract out of fixed recoverable costs. The entitlement to costs remains subject to CPR 45 unless there is clear contractual wording to the contrary. This is significant because receiving parties often argue that Part 36 entitles them to standard basis assessment. The decision confirms that Part 36 does not override the fixed regime. Intentional Torts and Police Claims The decision also addressed claims against the police involving intentional torts such as conversion or trespass to goods. Under CPR 26.9(10)(e), such claims are mandatorily allocated to the multi-track, which removes them from fixed recoverable costs. Importantly, the intentional tort need not be the dominant cause of action, inclusion alone may suffice. For paying parties, this means careful analysis of pleadings is critical before advancing a fixed costs argument. Procedural Nature of FRC Expansion The court treated the October 2023 extension of FRC as procedural rather than substantive. That allows the regime to apply even where the underlying claim settled before the reform date, provided costs-only proceedings were issued later. This strengthens transitional arguments in favour of defendants in ongoing paying party costs disputes. Strategic Implications at Detailed Assessment The decision reinforces several key defence principles: Timing of proceedings determines FRC applicability Part 36 does not disapply fixed costs without express wording Police intentional tort pleadings may remove a case from FRC Transitional provisions can favour defendants Where FRC does not apply, defendants should still consider robust challenges based on proportionality , guideline hourly rates , and broader recoverability and conduct arguments. Why This Matters Whether FRC applies can dramatically alter exposure. The difference between fixed costs and standard basis assessment may represent a substantial reduction in liability. This case confirms that defendants must scrutinise: procedural timing settlement wording pleadings allocation rules These are not technicalities — they are exposure-control tools. Key Takeaways Costs-only proceedings issued post-October 2023 may trigger FRC Part 36 does not automatically disapply fixed costs Police intentional tort claims can fall outside the FRC regime Transitional arguments may significantly reduce liability Early strategic input improves defence positioning We act for local authorities, insurers and public bodies in defending costs claims involving fixed recoverable costs, Part 36 and detailed assessment. Detailed Assessment Strategy Guides Detailed Assessment of Costs: The Complete Guide Paying Party Detailed Assessment Strategy How Paying Parties Challenge a Bill of Costs Proportionality Challenges at Detailed Assessment Fee Earner Delegation Challenges at Detailed Assessment Guideline Hourly Rates 2026 Intermediate Track Costs Tables

  • Electronic Bills of Costs: Structure, Precedent H Alignment and Detailed Assessment

    Electronic bills of costs are now standard in multi-track litigation and require a structured approach to preparation and assessment. The phase, task and activity format is designed to mirror Precedent H and enables detailed comparison between the approved budget and the costs claimed. Understanding how electronic bills operate is essential for both receiving and paying parties involved in detailed assessment. What Is an Electronic Bill of Costs? An electronic bill of costs presents time in a spreadsheet format organised by phases, tasks and activities. This structure allows the work undertaken to be analysed and compared directly with the approved costs budget. The objective is transparency so that the court and the parties can identify what work was carried out, by whom and at what stage of the litigation. Phases, Tasks and Activities Electronic bills are designed to reflect the structure of Precedent H: phases correspond to the stages of litigation tasks identify the type of work undertaken activities describe the specific action performed This format allows the bill to be reviewed alongside the approved budget and its assumptions. Relationship with Precedent H The approved costs budget remains the starting point on detailed assessment. Time recorded within each phase of the electronic bill should correspond with the phases and assumptions contained in Precedent H. Where work falls outside those assumptions, the court will consider whether there is good reason to depart from the approved budget. Common Issues in Electronic Bills Issues that frequently arise on detailed assessment include: time recorded in an incorrect phase inconsistent task descriptions block billing within activities duplication of attendances excessive senior fee earner time on routine work work claimed outside the scope of the budget assumptions These matters may affect both the presentation of the bill and the assessment of recoverable costs. Analysis on Detailed Assessment A structured review of an electronic bill involves: comparing phase totals with the approved budget identifying work that does not fall within the budget assumptions analysing time by task and fee earner grade considering proportionality within each phase This phase-based approach assists the court in determining whether the costs claimed are reasonable and proportionate and should be considered alongside proportionality challenges in costs. Points of Dispute and Electronic Bills Effective points of dispute and replies to an electronic bill should address: alignment between the bill and Precedent H phases clarity of task and activity descriptions time recorded outside the approved scope delegation and fee earner grade Addressing these matters at phase level as well as by individual entry supports a structured detailed assessment. Requests for Re-presentation Where an electronic bill does not allow proper comparison with the approved budget, it may be necessary to request re-presentation. This can arise where: phases do not correspond with Precedent H task and activity information is unclear time cannot be reconciled with the budget A properly structured bill assists both the court and the parties during detailed assessment. J-Codes and Bill Structure The use of J-Codes is not mandatory. The critical requirement is that the bill presents time in a clear phase and task format that allows comparison with the approved budget. The focus on detailed assessment is therefore on transparency and structure rather than the coding system used. Preparing Electronic Bills For receiving parties, careful preparation of the electronic bill includes: ensuring phase totals match the approved budget using clear task and activity descriptions maintaining consistency between time records and the bill aligning the bill with the Precedent H assumptions This assists the court and reduces the likelihood of queries on detailed assessment. Assessing Electronic Bills For paying parties, a structured review of the electronic bill enables: comparison with the approved budget identification of work outside scope analysis of fee earner grade and delegation consideration of proportionality by phase This supports a focused and efficient approach to detailed assessment and the preparation of points of dispute and replies. How We Assist with Electronic Bills of Costs We prepare and analyse electronic bills for detailed assessment, including phase alignment with Precedent H, task and activity review and the preparation of points of dispute and replies. Our work supports both receiving and paying parties in presenting and assessing electronic bills in a clear and compliant format as part of our paying party costs services. Detailed Assessment Strategy Guides Detailed Assessment of Costs: The Complete Guide Paying Party Detailed Assessment Strategy How Paying Parties Challenge a Bill of Costs Proportionality Challenges at Detailed Assessment Fee Earner Delegation Challenges at Detailed Assessment Guideline Hourly Rates 2026 Intermediate Track Costs Tables Specialist support for detailed assessment and electronic bills of costs Clear, structured analysis of phases, tasks and budget alignment.

  • CCMS Restoration and the End of the Legal Aid Average Payment Scheme

    The Legal Aid Agency (LAA) has issued a further update confirming key deadlines connected to CCMS billing, contingency legal aid payments, and the end of the Average Payment Scheme in January 2026. With Average Payment Scheme recoupment due to begin shortly afterwards, civil and crime legal aid providers should now be prioritising the preparation of outstanding legal aid costs claims to avoid cashflow disruption and account deficits. Key Dates for Average Payment Scheme Recoupment Legal aid providers should ensure the following dates are firmly diarised: 22 December 2025 – Controlled work fee uplifts take effect 12 January 2026 – Average Payment Scheme ends 19 January 2026 – Final Average Payment Scheme payments made 26 January 2026 – Average Payment Scheme recoupment process begins 2 February 2026 – First recoupments applied to payments received These dates are critical for planning the submission of legal aid costs claims through CCMS. Contingency Legal Aid Billing and Prior Authority For matters billed under contingency arrangements during CCMS disruption, the LAA has confirmed: Prior authority granted by email remains valid proof of authorisation Prior authority decisions made under contingency will not be uploaded to CCMS A copy of the prior authority grant email must be submitted with the legal aid costs claim There is no requirement to reapply via CCMS where prior authority has already been granted Ensuring that prior authority evidence is clearly linked to each costs claim will help reduce delays during assessment. Average Payment Scheme Recoupment – Why Early Costs Preparation Matters The Average Payment Scheme will close on 12 January 2026, with recoupments starting from 26 January 2026. Although the LAA has built in a short gap between final payments and recoupment, firms that are not ready to submit their legal aid costs claims promptly may see recoupments applied before final bills are paid. To minimise the impact of Average Payment Scheme recoupment, providers should now: Identify all matters paid under the Average Payment Scheme Prepare and finalise legal aid costs claims in advance of January 2026 Check that all supporting documentation is complete Submit bills via CCMS as soon as they are bill-ready Proactive preparation is essential to protecting cashflow and avoiding unnecessary deficits on legal aid accounts. Legal Aid Fee Uplifts and CCMS Billing A statutory instrument introducing increases to some civil and crime legal aid fees takes effect on 22 December 2025. Providers should be aware that: Controlled work fee uplifts apply to matters starting on or after 22 December 2025 Fee uplifts must continue to be applied via the contingency process until standard CCMS billing routes are fully restored The deadline for December legal aid claims is 20 January 2026 Licensed work fee uplifts remain under development Correct application of fee uplifts within legal aid costs claims will be essential to avoid underpayment. Issues such as CCMS restoration, rejected bills, contingency billing errors or delayed payments often arise where Legal Aid costs have not been drafted and submitted in accordance with procedural requirements, which is why specialist support for Legal Aid costs drafting, CCMS claims and assessment strategy can be essential. Staying Updated on CCMS and Legal Aid Payments The LAA has confirmed that future updates will be issued on an as-needed basis, rather than bi-weekly. Providers should continue monitoring GOV.UK for guidance on CCMS billing, contingency arrangements, and legal aid payments. How SPH Costs Supports Legal Aid Costs Claims With Average Payment Scheme recoupment approaching, now is the time to ensure your legal aid costs claims are prepared and ready for submission. At SPH Costs, we support legal aid providers with: Preparation and submission of legal aid costs claims via CCMS Reviewing contingency legal aid billing and prior authority compliance Ensuring correct application of legal aid fee uplifts Reducing the financial impact of Average Payment Scheme recoupment If you would like assistance preparing your legal aid costs claims ahead of recoupment, please contact the SPH Costs team. Legal Aid costs claims frequently involve technical issues around billing, assessment, and compliance with Legal Aid Agency requirements. Specialist Legal Aid costs drafting support is often required to ensure claims are prepared and progressed correctly within the applicable framework. Our Legal Aid costs drafting services are explained in more detail on our Legal Aid Costs Drafting .

  • CPR 47.15 Provisional Assessment: The £75,000 Costs Limit

    Provisional assessment under CPR 47.15 was introduced to deal with lower value detailed assessments on the papers rather than through a full oral hearing. The procedure currently applies where the bill of costs does not exceed £75,000. The Association of Costs Lawyers (ACL) is currently undertaking a survey of its members to assess how effective the provisional assessment process has been in practice. The survey also asks whether the £75,000 limit remains appropriate. When the scheme was originally piloted, it applied only to bills of up to £25,000, and the process appeared to work reasonably well. The increase to £75,000 has prompted ongoing debate, particularly regarding how the limit should be interpreted. Some judges have taken the view that the £75,000 threshold is exclusive of VAT, based on the interpretation that the definition of “costs” in the Civil Procedure Rules does not expressly include VAT, which is defined separately elsewhere in the rules. If such a strict interpretation were applied more widely, it raises interesting questions—for example whether an order for costs would need to expressly refer to both costs and VAT. Another issue often raised is whether the £1,500 plus VAT and court fee cap on the costs of provisional assessment is reasonable when dealing with bills approaching the £75,000 limit. In practice, it may be more realistic to assume that cases at the upper end of the provisional assessment threshold are more likely to proceed to an oral hearing. In that sense, provisional assessment can be viewed as a mechanism for narrowing the issues between the parties, rather than as the final determination of the dispute. This approach may carry some risk, particularly where significant costs are incurred that may not ultimately be recoverable if the matter concludes at the provisional stage. However, the process may still prove worthwhile if it helps focus the issues and ultimately leads to a better outcome at detailed assessment. For assistance with costs disputes and detailed assessment, see our guidance on paying party costs.

  • Indemnity Costs: Why Hindsight Remains an Inappropriate Test - and How Courts Apply the Principle at Assessment

    Context: The Rule Against Hindsight in Indemnity Costs In costs law , it is established that indemnity costs should generally be awarded only where conduct was unreasonable at the time it occurred, not with the benefit of hindsight. This reflects a fundamental fairness principle: a party should not be penalised for strategic decisions that only later appear unwise behavior must be judged based on information reasonably available at the time it was made This case reaffirmed that approach and continues to influence how indemnity costs are applied in practice. What the Decision Confirms The key principle from this decision is: Indemnity costs should not be awarded based on hindsight review of events. Rather, indemnity must be justified by conduct that is unreasonable when measured at the relevant point in time. This denies the temptation to say, after an outcome is unfavourable: “It was obvious at the end that this was a bad strategy — so indemnity is justified.” Instead, courts look at the information and context available at the moment the disputed conduct occurred. This protects strategic freedom of litigation while still enabling costs consequences for genuinely unreasonable conduct. Why This Matters in Costs Disputes Understanding this principle is not academic, it has real implications for: arguing indemnity costs claims defending against indemnity costs applications resisting indemnity at detailed assessment framing conduct evidence strategically Indemnity costs awards can shift recoverable totals dramatically, especially when combined with other challenges. A party’s conduct throughout the case becomes the battleground; how it is framed in submissions can determine whether indemnity is justified. Practical Application at Detailed Assessment The “Conduct at the Time” Test Courts look at: what information was reasonably known when decisions were taken why particular strategic choices were made whether there was a real basis for the conduct at that time if any deviation from standard practice was truly justified This test avoids penalising reasonable strategy that only later proved unsuccessful. For paying parties and respondents alike, the focus is: “What did the other side know  and reasonably do  at the time?” How Paying Parties Use This in Indemnity Challenges Practical methods for resisting indemnity costs include: demonstrating that decisions were objectively reasonable at the relevant time showing that opposing arguments rest on hindsight assumptions relating conduct to contemporaneous correspondence and case events drawing out the difference between hindsight logic and real-time decision-making The stronger your evidence on real-time justification, the harder it is for indemnity to be justified on hindsight review. When Indemnity Costs Are Still Justified Although hindsight should not be used, indemnity costs are appropriately awarded when conduct at the time was: plainly unreasonable abusive or obstructive in breach of a clear rule or court order manifestly without real basis Indemnity remains a tool to penalise truly inappropriate conduct, but not merely to reward post-hoc criticism of decisions that were reasonable at the time. Common Mistakes That Lead to Indemnity Awards Parties (and sometimes less experienced practitioners) fall into traps such as: arguing that “it was obvious this would fail” long before the hearing attacking strategic choices with hindsight language assuming a different outcome should mean indemnity failing to locate conduct in a real-time context These mistakes make indemnity awards more likely. Bringing This Into Costs Strategy Understanding the hindsight rule helps in: Resisting indemnity at assessment Framing conduct submissions effectively Preparing opposing party evidence Modelling total recoverable costs (including costs of indemnity applications) This links back into broader themes such as: assessment strategy recoverability planning paying party dispute tactics Key Takeaways The “no hindsight” rule is foundational to indemnity costs Conduct is judged in real time, not with benefit of outcome Indemnity can still be justified for truly unreasonable conduct Challengers succeed by rooting arguments in contemporaneous evidence This principle matters not just in theory, but in assessment strategy

  • How VAT Treatment in Costs Budgets Affects Recovery Strategy After Marbrow

    Quick Summary of the Decision The issue in Marbrow  was whether a costs budget should be treated as inclusive or exclusive of VAT when assessing recoverability limits. The court confirmed that, unless clearly stated otherwise, budgeting figures are generally treated as exclusive of VAT, meaning VAT may be recoverable in addition to the approved phase totals. On the surface this looks like a technical budgeting clarification. In reality, it has practical consequences for forecasting, proportionality arguments , and assessment disputes. Why This Matters Beyond the Case This decision is not just about accounting treatment. It affects: How costs professionals structure Precedent H budgets How paying parties analyse exposure risk How receiving parties protect recoverability How proportionality challenges are framed at detailed assessment Misunderstanding VAT treatment can distort: total litigation cost forecasting settlement strategy the perceived gap between budgeted and claimed costs That makes this a recoverability and risk issue , not just a drafting point. The Strategic Impact on Costs Budgeting 1️⃣ Budget Presentation Risk If a budget is unclear on VAT treatment: Paying parties may argue that phase totals were intended to be VAT inclusive Receiving parties may face disputes about whether claims exceed approved limits Clarity in drafting avoids later arguments that the budget has been exceeded when VAT is added. 2️⃣ Exposure Analysis for Paying Parties From a paying party perspective , treating budgets as VAT-exclusive means: The real financial exposure is higher than the approved phase totals suggest Settlement modelling must account for VAT on top of budgeted figures Proportionality arguments based purely on budget totals may understate recoverable sums This affects how early-stage offers and reserve calculations should be approached. 3️⃣ Interaction with Proportionality VAT treatment can influence proportionality debates: Budgets approved exclusive of VAT may still lead to totals that appear high once VAT is added Paying parties may try to argue that the overall  figure is disproportionate even if phase figures were approved Understanding this interaction helps frame arguments on: Reasonableness Budget adherence Global proportionality Practical Guidance for Costs Professionals ✔ When Preparing Budgets State expressly whether figures are exclusive of VAT Ensure assumptions sections align with VAT treatment Avoid ambiguity that invites post-assessment arguments ✔ When Acting for Paying Parties Analyse whether VAT was addressed during the budgeting stage Factor VAT into exposure modelling from the outset Consider whether any ambiguity supports arguments that totals were intended as global caps ✔ At Detailed Assessment This issue can arise where: There is a dispute over whether claimed sums exceed the approved budget VAT pushes totals above phase limits Parties argue about the meaning of approved figures Being able to link budgeting treatment to recoverability principles strengthens the argument on both sides. Why This Decision Still Matter Although procedural rules continue to evolve, budgeting disputes remain common. VAT treatment is one of those “small” technical points that can shift recoverable totals significantly, particularly in multi-phase or high-value litigation. For costs practitioners, this case reinforces a wider principle: Budgeting is not just about numbers — it is about how those numbers will be interpreted later in a recoverability dispute . Understanding VAT treatment helps avoid artificial arguments about budget exceedance and ensures that financial exposure is assessed realistically from the outset. Disputes over whether VAT pushes a claim beyond an approved budget are not rare on assessment, particularly where phase assumptions are unclear Key Takeaways Costs budgets are generally treated as exclusive of VAT unless stated otherwise This affects real exposure, not just drafting mechanics Ambiguity can lead to disputes at assessment Paying parties should model VAT risk early Receiving parties should draft budgets to eliminate later interpretation arguments

  • INVOICING THE CLIENT – MORE RETAINER PROBLEMS LAID BARE

    Issues surrounding retainers and client invoicing are not just solicitor–client concerns. They frequently resurface later during costs assessment, where paying parties examine whether costs were properly incurred under a valid retainer. If the retainer wording, scope of authority, or charging structure is unclear, opponents may argue that work was not recoverable at all, not because it was unnecessary, but because the entitlement to charge was defective. The case below highlights how retainer issues can have consequences beyond the solicitor-client relationship In a previous blog we dealt with some issues which arise if the retainer between a Solicitor and Client has not been well thought through. We now have another case where such a retainer has been subjected to close scrutiny by the Court, this time in relation to whether invoices rendered to the client were effectively requests for payment on account or, alternatively, self-contained (“statute”) bills which were capable of being sued upon. The lesson to be learned? If you want to be able to send a statute bill – say so, very clearly, in the retainer document. In these days, a Solicitor who does not carefully think about funding and cash flow will probably be characterised as being either too rich or too lazy. For the vast majority of practitioners, ensuring that a client fully understands the invoicing regime is crucial not only in terms of the financial aspects, but also to ensure that there are no surprises and that the client is kept happy. Perhaps the best way to start here therefore is to consider the fairly brief summary of the relevant law set out in Bari v Rosen [2012] EWHC 1782 (QB): 13 … Where a solicitor issues to his client a bill of costs which complies with the requirements of the Solicitors Act 1974 it is known colloquially as a “statute bill”. Section 70(1) of the Act gives the client the right, within one month of delivery of the bill, to apply to the High Court for the bill to be assessed, without requiring any sum to be paid into court. If no such application is made, the absolute right to assessment is lost. However, if a statute bill has not been paid and the client applies to the High Court for assessment of the bill within twelve months from delivery of the bill, the combined effect of s 70(2) and (3) is that the High Court may allow assessment (and I am advised by my assessors usually does allow assessment), on such terms as the court thinks fit. If the bill remains unpaid and twelve months have expired from delivery of the bill, the court may only order an assessment if special circumstances are shown. 14 The position after a statute bill has been paid is somewhat different. The client still has the absolute right to an assessment before the expiry of one month from delivery of the bill. After that, but only up to twelve months from the date of payment, if the client applies for assessment, special circumstances need to be shown. No assessment at all can be ordered after the expiration of twelve months from payment. Section 70(4) creates an absolute bar. For completeness I should mention that there are additional provisions where the solicitor has obtained judgment on the bill, but this does not arise in the present case. All of this was relevant in the case of Vlamaki v Sookias & Sookias [2015] EWHC 3334 (QB), where the High Court was dealing with an appeal from Master Campbell in the SCCO in a matter where the Claimant sought leave to have assessment of her Solicitors’ costs. At the heart of the case was whether various invoices rendered to the client whilst matters were continuing should be treated as final bills for the work done in the periods to which they related – and thus the clock would be ticking for the various time limits in section 70 set out above. The High Court rehearsed the argument that in general, a retainer between a Solicitor and client is an “entire contract” and the Solicitors can only claim remuneration when either all of the work is completed or there has been a natural break in the matter. However, this is subject to any express agreement to the contrary and it is perfectly in order for Solicitors to seek to agree a different provision. Thus, the general rule will be that invoices rendered during the course of a matter will be treated as requests for payment on account rather than final, or what are commonly called “statute bills”. It is permissible for a Solicitor to transfer money from client account to office account when money has been paid in by the client even if that is not pursuant to a statute bill, provided that the amount so transferred does not exceed the work actually done. The main benefit of treating such invoices as no more than payments on account is that it is open to the Solicitor to adjust the charges at the conclusion of the matter (upwards or downwards) in order to reflect the particular circumstances of the case. Most Solicitors will be aware of the so-called “7 pillars of wisdom” which are directly relevant to Solicitors’ charges and which may mean (again depending upon what is actually in the retainer) that until the matter has been concluded the appropriate amount to be charged cannot be properly known. On the other hand, a statute bill cannot be adjusted later, but if it is not paid, then the Solicitor will be able to sue upon it without waiting until the end of the matter. In this case, Master Campbell had found that the retainer did not contractually entitle the Solicitors to render Statute bills during the currency of each matter. After a close analysis of the wording of the retainer, the High Court agreed with the Master. In interpreting the retainer, the Court proceeded on the basis of the fundamental principles that where there was ambiguity, this would be construed against the Solicitors and that the client here was not a lawyer and therefore could not be assumed to know the provisions of the Solicitors Act (or indeed the law generally). The Court took account of the provisions in the retainer which suggested that interest could be charged upon these invoices if they were not paid and that the Solicitors could insist upon their payment, but found that to a layperson, they would not understand the wording to represent the right to deliver statute bills. In construing the retainer against the Solicitors, the Court found that it was not in the client’s interest for these invoices to be treated as statute bills and approved the consideration of Master Leonard at first instance in Bari in which he said: “The potential difficulties and expense faced by a client who can only challenge regular bills by instituting multiple assessment proceedings – against the same solicitor who is actively handling a number of current matters … – are obvious. Further, the choice is between a right which begins to diminish after one month from the first regular bill and a right which does not begin to diminish until a later and, for the client, obviously more practicable time.” The most fundamental point which the Court made here was that the retainer lacked an express statement that each interim invoice would be a final (statute) bill. It is clear from the Judgement that if Solicitors want interim invoices to be treated as statute bills then they had best set that out explicitly and extremely clearly in their retainer documentation. So far so good for the Claimant. However, there was a very neat argument from the Defendants which rather left the Claimant being “hoist by her own petard”. The Defendant said that if the Court was against them on their contention that the invoices should be treated as statute bills, then it must surely follow that there had been no statute bills delivered and therefore the Claimant’s application for a Solicitors Act Assessment must be premature. After considering the construction of a letter written by the Defendants upon termination of their retainer, the Court found that this letter could not convert what had previously been no more than requests for payment on account into Statute bills. At first instance, Mastic Campbell had found that this letter had the effect of bringing the series of bills to a head and that the final invoice should be treated as a statute bill to incorporate all of the previous invoices done. The High Court disagreed and therefore the Claimant was left in a position where the application for assessment of the invoices could not proceed because no final or statute bill had ever been delivered. Practical Steps Firms Should Take To reduce exposure to retainer-based challenges during assessment: Ensure engagement letters clearly define scope and charging structure Record supervision and delegation transparently Avoid ambiguous “all work required” descriptions Review retainer wording when matters change in complexity Seek specialist input where recoverability could be questioned Why This Matters in Costs Disputes Retainer problems rarely stay confined to client complaints. They are increasingly deployed by paying parties during detailed assessment to argue that: Work was not authorised The scope of the retainer did not cover the activity claimed Charging arrangements were unclear or non-compliant The indemnity principle prevents recovery These arguments often appear late in proceedings, when positions are entrenched and the sums at stake are significant. Clear retainer drafting and structured time recording are therefore not merely administrative issues, they are central to protecting costs recovery. The Strategic Point Retainer issues are often viewed as professional conduct matters. In reality, they are costs risk issues . A technically strong case can still suffer reductions if entitlement to charge is not clearly evidenced. Specialist costs professionals regularly encounter these arguments during assessment. Addressing potential vulnerabilities early is far easier than defending them once raised.

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